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CARIBBEAN DIVORCE FOR AMERICANS: USEFUL
ALTERNATIVE OR OBSOLESCENT INSTITUTION?
Restrictive American divorce laws have long made the liberal grounds
available in foreign countries an attractive solution for American
divorce-seekers.' The availability and desirability of foreign divorce has,
however, been affected in recent years by various developments in this
country and abroad. Mexico, once the acknowledged haven for disen-
chanted couples,2 in 1971 abruptly terminated its generous policy of
accommodating United States citizens.' Within four months, two small
Caribbean nations, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, liberalized their
statutes to capitalize on the thirsting American demand for easy di-
vorces, 4 and shortly thereafter each country was dissolving approxi-
mately one hundred American marriages per month. 5 At the same time
1. See Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to
Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267, 282-83 (1971); Comment, Mexican Bilateral
Divorce-A Catalyst in Divorce Jurisdiction Theory?, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 584, 584-85 (1966).
See also Berke, Mexican Divorces, 7 PRAc. LAW. 84 (No. 3, Mar. 1961).
2. Note, Isle of Hispaniola: American Divorce Haven?, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 198,
n.2 (1973):
Divorce was reportedly a $50 million-a-year business in Mexico that drew some
18,000 Americans annually. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § 10, at 1, col. 1.
Another commentator has reported an estimate that "anywhere from ten to thirty thou-
sand New Yorkers a year ended their marriages in Mexico." M. WHEELER, No-FAULT
DIVORCE 164 (1974).
3. The Mexican Law Digest of 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORv 3660 (1976)
notes:
Decree of Feb. 8, 1971 amends Art. 35 of Nationality and Naturalization Law
which now provides that no judicial or administrative authority shall grant di-
vorce to aliens unless a certificate issued by ministry of the Interior (Gobernacion)
stating parties have legal residence in country and their legal immigration status
permits them to petition for divorce in Mexico, is filed with court.
Article 35 now requires six months' residence before a noncitizen can petition for divorce.
Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 198.
4. O'Neil, City Issuing Marriage Licenses to Parties in Caribbean Divorces, 166
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 7:
The Republic of Haiti amended its divorce laws by a law published June 28. The
Dominican Republic, over the veto of its president, enacted similar liberalization
on June 4, 1971. The actions followed a tightening of Mexco's divorce laws in
March.
WHEELER, supra note 2, at 166 states:
Two countries on the Caribbean island of Hispanola [sic], Haiti and the Domini-
can Republic, quickly jumped into the vacuum Mexico had left. Both were careful
to pattern their laws after the old Mexican statute . ...
5. Divorce, Caribbean Style: Quickie Divorces, IME, Aug. 30, 1971, at 43.
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that Latin America was undergoing these legislative changes, a conspic-
uous divorce reform movement was underway in the United States.
Once a model of marital conservatism, the American legislative pattern
by 1974 reflected "a mosaic of no-fault divorce."'
Finding the ideal divorce forum can be problematic for those desiring
to terminate their marriage. For some, a prompt disposition is of the
utmost importance. For others, avoiding the embarrassment and stigma
of publicity is a prime concern. Some couples may be unable to obtain
a local decree due to weak grounds or insufficient evidence. Still others
search for the least expensive divorce.
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether the adoption of
modern American no-fault divorce grounds can meet the needs of
United States citizens who might otherwise terminate their marriages
in a foreign country.7 American no-fault legislation and Caribbean di-
vorce law are compared with respect to five major variables-grounds
for dissolution, required evidentiary showing, speed of court process,
monetary costs, and avoidance of publicity. Prospects for recognition
and validity of Caribbean decrees in each of the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico are evaluated. The
analysis seeks to identify which, if any, of the Caribbean advantages
remain, and attempts to assess whether the American divorce-seeker is
truly better off staying at home.
I
COMPARISON OF DOMINICAN, HAITIAN, AND U.S. DIVORCE
A. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
Of the jurisdictions examined herein, the Dominican Republic has
adopted by far the most liberal grounds for divorce. The mutual consent
6. Foster & Freed, Family Law, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 401 (1974).
7. The foreign divorce trade has been problematic due to other reasons as well. For its
American consumer, the legal recognition accorded to his foreign divorce is dependent on
the circumstances of each case and the jurisdiction in which a challenge is initiated. See
generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419 (1967). To the attorney, recommending the foreign
decree may lead to disciplinary action by the bar for breach of ethical standards. See e.g.,
In re Anonymous, 274 App.Div. 289, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dept. 1948), which maintained
that advising clients to seek foreign decrees, with knowledge that the state will not grant
comity, "will be deemed sufficient basis for appropriate disciplinary action." For consum-
ers and practitioners alike, the need for the foreign trade has promoted the rise of travel
companies and tourist agencies which defraud the public and feed on the urgency of
foreign divorce-seekers for their livelihood. See Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc., 120 N.J.
Super. 260, 293 A.2d 706 (Ch. Div. 1972), in which a tour company which sold "travel
packages" with the purpose of obtaining Haitian divorces was found guilty of violation of
the State's Consumer Fraud Act.
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of both parties to terminate the marriage is a sufficient basis for the
court to grant a decree.8 This consent is usually manifested to the Do-
minican court by the physical presence of one party and the representa-
tion of the other through an attorney.'
Similarly, Article 220 of the Haitian code lists "the mutual and steady
consent of the spouses" 0 as an actionable ground for divorce. However,
narrow restriction and close regulation of this ground by Haitian courts
have precluded its use by United States citizens." In fact, the judicial
tendency to make painstaking investigations into the veracity and na-
ture of the alleged consent renders this ground unattractive to native
Caribbeans as well. 12 In addition, statutory requirements as to age and
length of marriage plus a forced period of attempted reconciliation make
mutual consent unavailable for Americans desiring a "quickie" di-
vorce. Due to the problems inherent in obtaining dissolutions by mu-
tual consent, most Americans seek divorce in Haiti on the ground of
8. 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 3368 (1976); Forscher, Haitian, Dominican
Laws of Divorce Evaluated (Part 1), 166 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1971, at 4, col. 3, cites Article
I, Paragraph V of Dominican Law No. 142, enacted on June 4, 1971:
Foreigners who are in this country, although not residents, can be divorced by
mutual consent, providing, however, that at least one of the parties must be
physically present, and the other represented by a special attorney in fact.
9. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, col. 3.
10. Id., citing the Haitian code:
Art. 220-The mutual and steady consent of the spouses expressed as prescribed
by law, under the conditions and after the trials that it prescribes, will prove
sufficiently that the conjugal life is insupportable and that it exists, in regard to
them, a peremptory ground for divorce.
11. Forscher, Haitian, Dominican Laws of Divorce Evaluated (Part 2), Oct. 20, 1971,
at 4, col. 2, writes:
As a practical measure, no foreigner can secure a divorce in Haiti upon the ground
of mutual consent. Indeed, the ground of mutual consent is rarely employed, even
by Haitians, and even more rarely granted. It appears that the Haitian courts take
the utmost pains and conduct the most protracted investigation to establish that
the consent is not only both "mutual and steady," but also that the proof thereof
is sufficient to establish "that the conjugal life is insupportable," all of which
requirements are contained in article 220 of the Haitian law [footnote omitted].
12. Id.
13. Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 202 states:
Mutual consent for both native and foreign parties, is only available if the male
is at least twenty-five years old and the female is between the ages of twenty-one
and forty-five. The parties must have been married at least two years but not over
twenty. To these age and duration requirements the court has initiated a pro-
tracted waiting period of at least fifteen months with court sponsored attempts
at reconciliation during that period. This procedure makes divorce by mutual
consent in Haiti a rather rigorous exercise and impracticable for Americans seek-
ing a Mexican-style divorce.
[Vol. 10:116
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"incompatibility of character."" This ground, closely akin to American
no-fault requirements, was enacted solely for the benefit of foreign tour-
ists.',
Unlike the Dominican Republic, no American jurisdiction to date will
grant a divorce solely on the ground of mutual consent." Among the no-
fault grounds available in the United States are "incompatibility" and
"irreconcilable differences." Statutory definitions of these concepts in-
dicate their practical equivalence. Incompatibility, recognized as a le-
gitimate ground for divorce in six American states," "may be broadly
defined as such a deep and irreconcilable conflict in the personalities or
temperaments of the parties as makes it impossible for them to continue
a normal marital relationship.' 8 "Irreconcilable differences" or "irre-
trievable breakdown," first recognized as a basis for dissolution in Cali-
fornia' 9 and now followed in twenty-six jurisdictions,"0 have been defined
as:
14. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, Col. 3, cites the pertinent portions of the new Haitian
divorce code enacted June 28, 1971:
Article I. The grounds for divorce for tourists, visiting persons and residing
aliens remain the same as those prescribed by articles 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 and
220 of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, if the spouses have ceased to live together
and a separation of bed and board between them has lasted one year, this shall
be grounds for divorce. Incompatibility of Character shall also constitute grounds
for divorce.
Incompatibility was similarly the basis for practically all of the Mexican quickie di-
vorces prior to their extinction in 1971. Id. at 4, col. 1.
15. Id. at 4, col. 1.
16. R. KAHN & L. KAHN, THE DIVORCE LAWYERS' CASEBOOK 115 (1972) notes that despite
the march of no-fault reform, the American legal system "does not treat the marriage
contract so lightly as to permit 'consent' divorces or divorce by mutual agreement."
17. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 34, §§ 20-22 (Supp. 1974); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.110
(Michie 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.010 (1975);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
18. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1218, 1219 (1958).
19. Comment, New York Conciliation and Divorce, 37 ALB. L. REV. 751, 759 (1973),
citing CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4506 (Deering 1972).
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4508 (West
Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (1973); GEN. STAT. CONN. § 46-32 (1975); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE
ANN. § 30.102 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-41 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 32-
603 (Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-11.5-3 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17
(Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691
(Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (Supp. 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.86 (1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.305 (Supp. 1976); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 48-316 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-361 (1974); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-03 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.7-a (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §
107.025 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (Supp. 1975); TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.01
(1975); V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 16, § 104 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030
(Supp. 1975).
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Those grounds which are determined by the court to be substantial rea-
sons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the
marriage should be dissolved.
2 '
The remaining twenty-one American jurisdictions have either re-
tained only traditional fault grounds for divorce such as adultery, cru-
elty, or abandonment, 22 acknowledged insanity as a legitimate no-fault
ground,n or granted no-fault dissolutions after the parties have lived
apart for some statutory period.
24
By comparing the grounds for divorce in the countries under consider-
ation several conclusions are apparent. The grounds in the Dominican
Republic are clearly the most convenient. Dominican divorces are essen-
tially groundless; plaintiff and defendant need only jointly ask the court
to dissolve their marriage. No allegations of fault or incompatibility,
irreconcilable differences, or irretrievable breakdown are required.
Haiti, on the other hand, in enacting incompatibility as its basis for
foreign divorce, offers grounds which are no more advantageous than
those available to citizens in the thirty-two American no-fault jurisdic-
tions. Only residents of the remaining twenty-one dominions (where
fault concepts, insanity, or living apart are the recognized grounds)
would find the Haitian legislation more sympathetic and expeditious.
Couples in these latter jurisdictions could certainly obtain a no-fault
divorce in the Caribbean with less delay than in an alternative liberal
American state, where residency requirements of many weeks to many
months are stringently enforced.
2 .
B. THE EVIDENTIARY SHOWING
It is self-evident that parties to a Dominican bilateral divorce need
21. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4507 (West Supp. 1976).
22. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1976).
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24, 26 (Supp. 1975), MISS. CODE ANN. § 2735 (Supp.
1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-5, 50-6 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10
(Purdon 1955); VT. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, §§ 551, 631 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-2-4 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1959).
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24, 26 (Supp.
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW, § 170 (McKinney
1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-5, 50-6 (Supp. 1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01
(Supp. 1974); P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 31, § 321 (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (Supp. 1973);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-801, 36-802 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-1, 30-3-2 (Replace-
ment Vol. 3, Supp. 1975); VT. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 551, 631 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-91 (Replacement Vol. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 48-2-4 (Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1959).
25. WHEELER, supra note 2, at 157. See Foster & Freed, Durational Residency Require-
ments as Prerequisites for Divorce Jurisdiction, 9 FAM. L. Q. 555 (1975) for a complete
listing of residency requirements in American jurisdictions.
[Vol. 10:116
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make no affirmative evidentiary showing to receive a divorce. If both
parties are represented before the court the decree of dissolution must
be granted.6 Consequently, Dominican hearings tend to be "very brief
and purely pro-forma."
The evidentiary requirements in Haitian proceedings have been the
subject of some misconceptions. Since the grounds for divorce adopted
in Haiti were virtually identical to the old Mexican grounds, an observer
might presume that Haitian divorce proceedings, like their Mexican
predecessors, are mere rubber-stamp dispositions.2 8 This is not the case
by any means. 29 A Haitian judge is obligated to ascertain the likelihood
of a reconciliation, and can only docket the case when he is convinced
that reconciliation cannot be accomplished.3 1 Once this finding has been
made, the court, through its own questioning, conducts an extensive
inquiry into the alleged grounds'.3 The Haitian tribunal has the author-
ity to compel the plaintiff to be present, 32 although it cannot require
testimony of an independent witness. 3
3
Similar to Haitian practice, American no-fault law demands a sub-
stantive affirmative showing. American appellate courts have repeat-
edly emphasized that a "no-fault" divorce is not a "no-grounds" di-
vorce. Where grounds of incompatibility are asserted, the mere mutual
request of the parties will not serve to dissolve the marriage. Rather, the
court must be satisfied from factual evidence demonstrating the degree
of incompatibility "that the parties can no longer live together. '34 In the
course of the hearing, the court is required to examine the personalities
and dispositions of the parties, their conduct within the marriage, the
reasons for the alleged incompatible situation, and the issue of whether
such situation results from volition, predisposition, or inherent defi-
ciency. It must weigh the need for the divorce against the possibilities
of adjustment and reconciliation.3 8 Only after presentation and careful
26. 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 3368 (1976).
27. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, col. 3.
28. Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 202 assumes that "incompatibility is basically a
procedural step both in Mexico and Haiti."
29. Forscher, supra note 11, at 4, col. 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, col. 1.
33. Id. at 4, col. 2.
34. Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 493, 50 P.2d 264, 272 (1935) [emphasis omitted].
See also Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
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evaluation of all available evidence can an American court grant the
decree.
The process is the same in states which grant divorces for irreconcila-
ble differences or irretrievable breakdown. In one court's opinion:
We do not view the matter of dissolution as being such a simple, unilat-
eral matter of one mate simply saying "I want out." All of the surround-
ing facts and circumstances are to be inquired into to arrive at the
conclusion as to whether or not indeed the marriage has reached the
terminal stage based upon facts which must be shown. Even in uncon-
tested dissolutions, the court would properly make inquiry to determine
this fact . . . .
The state of California has been instrumental in developing this area of
no-fault policy. The leading case of In re Marriage of McKim38 involved
a plea for a bilateral consent divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differ-
ences in which the plaintiff wife failed to be present at trial. The hus-
band offered uncontradicted testimony as to the existence of these dif-
ferences. Denying the decree, the Supreme Court of California re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with the following
reasoning:
Although the Legislature intended that as far as possible dissolution
proceedings should be nonadversary, eliminating acrimony, it did not
intend that findings of the existence of irreconcilable differences be made
perfunctorily. It rejected a proposal under which the court could have
been required to dissolve a marriage on a showing that the parties had
taken certain procedural steps and that a certain period of time had
passed. Instead the Family Law Act contemplates that "The court
should sit as an overseeing participant to do its utmost to effect a healing
of the marital wounds . . . ." The court cannot perform this contem-
plated function without evidence as to the condition of the marriage.3
The court refused to promulgate specific procedures to secure the re-
quired evidence at the hearing, but it endorsed the normal trial court
policy of ordering the plaintiff to appear and testify." Further, it upheld
the judicial policy of requiring the testimony of other competent wit-
nesses in exceptional cases.' A number of American jurisdictions de-
mand as a matter of practice the corroboration of no-fault claims by an
impartial third-party witness.
2
37. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973).
38. 6 Cal. 3d 673, 493 P.2d 868, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1972).
39. Id. at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
40. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 872-73, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
41. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 874, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
42. See M. MAYER, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT IN THE 50 STATES 27, 56 (2d ed. 1971);
[Vol. 10:116
Caribbean Divorce for Americans
Theoretically, the evidentiary showing in the United States is more
demanding than that required in the Caribbean. However, a survey of
the evidence required in practice indicates that divorce grounds in some
American courts are no more difficult to prove than in the Caribbean
forums. As one commentator has stated, "[T]he nature of the judge's
actual pattern of behavior is somewhat different than its theoretical
counterpart. '4 3 For example, a significant number of attorneys have
acknowledged that perjury is rampant in American divorce proceed-
ings." Allegations are often fabricated, and decrees are rarely denied.'5
It may be that adoption of more liberal divorce standards has lessened
the need for perjury; but it is equally true that the simpler the grounds
become, the easier it is to manufacture them.
Technically, no American jurisdiction has gone as far as the Domini-
can Republic by establishing mutual consent as a basis for dissolution.
But in actuality, it may be as effortless to contrive a divorce in the
United States as it is to request one in Santo Domingo.
Despite the harsh rules aimed at collusion, connivance, and the like, and
despite the basic theory that marriage is a sacred institution with the
state holding a participating interest, the vast majority of divorces and
annulments are by mutual consent and mutual action. This statement
flies in the face of religious attitudes, judicial platitudes, and legislative
intent, but it must be recognized as fact. Most divorces are uncontested,
which means that the defendant makes only a pro-forma defense, if any.
The evidence heard is one-sided and highly partisan (if not worse than
that), and what is supposed to be an adversary proceeding becomes
merely a ratification of private decisions previously made."
In theory, Haitian and American courts, unlike their Dominican
counterparts, demand an elaborate evidentiary showing of the alleged
grounds for divorce. The Haitian requirement is less stringent than that
of some United States courts which will order a separate witness's pres-
ence before the court. However, when actual American practice is exam-
ined, it appears that the factual showing required of divorce-seekers by
some judges will often be less than substantial.
C. SPEED OF COURT PROCESS
The couple whose marriage has broken down irreparably will often
Schulman, Incompatibility: A "New" Approach to the Dissolution of Marriage, 20 KAN.
L. REV. 227, 235 (1970). See also S. RoSENBLATr, THE DIVORCE RACKET 23 (1969).
43. Walker, supra note 1, at 284.
44. WHEELER, supra note 2, at 5.
45. Walker, supra note 1, at 284-85.
46. MAYER, supra note 42, at 56.
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desire a divorce as soon as possible. In terms of promptness, the Carib-
bean courts offer a clear advantage over American jurisdictions. Domin-
ican officials have announced that foreigners must wait no more than
72 hours for access to the courts. 7 In Haiti, once clerical procedures are
complied with, a hearing is granted and the decree is handed down
within three days.4 8
In contrast, an American divorce may require months of arduous wait-
ing. Of the thirty-two jurisdictions which have adopted incompatibility,
irreconcilable differences, or irretrievable breakdown as grounds for dis-
solution, two have enacted compulsory conciliation statutes requiring
the parties to submit to a period of counseling before the court will
entertain divorce proceedings." In thirteen other states, the courts in
their discretion may require conciliation proceedings prior to adjudica-
tion;50 the exercise of this choice will vary from case to case. In addition
to compelling conciliation proceedings, a number of states require a
"waiting period" before a final divorce decree may be entered.5' In those
states which have no authority to demand conciliation proceedings or
waiting periods, court congestion by itself can delay the process tedi-
ously.12
D. COST: DOLLARS AND CENTS
The out-of-pocket burdens of procuring a Caribbean divorce can eas-
ily deceive the American consumer. Legal costs for obtaining an Ameri-
can divorce vary from state to state, and the average may range from
$450 to $1,000.1 A Caribbean dissolution will only cost from $300 to
47. Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 203.
48. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, col. 2.
49. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.16 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (Supp.
1975).
50. Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.05 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (Supp.
1975); IDAHO CODE § 32-716 (Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-11.5-8 (Supp. 1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1608 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-822 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.7-b (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE. §
27-05.1-10 (Replacement Vol. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.540 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 8-10-5 (1975); TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.54 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030
(Supp. 1974).
51. See, e.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4514 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-
10-106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-44 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 32-716 (Supp. 1975);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-11.5-8 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (1973); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1A (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN § 25.89(6) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.030 (1969).
52. Bronstein, The Question of Haitian and Dominican Divorces, 166 N.Y.L.J., Sept.
21, 1971, at 4, col. 1. Bronstein notes that New York court calendars may result in a delay
of two or three months in processing a divorce.
53. KAHN & KAHN, supra note 16, at 122.
[Vol. 10:116
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$500, but this figure fails to take into account travel, lodging, and inci-
dental expenses.54 These concurrent outlays considerably surpass those
incurred in the former typical Mexican divorce.5 When the total is
calculated, the cost of dissolving a marriage in the Caribbean easily
exceeds the typical expense of the American process. This total has been
estimated at $1,000,11 and one observer has stated that it can easily
exceed $1,500.5
E. AvOIDING PUBLICITY
Even in an amicable bilateral consent proceeding, the act of terminat-
ing one's marriage can be a very emotional and painful experience. The
parties may feel considerable relief in one respect, and yet suffer humili-
ation and disgrace in another. American no-fault reform has mitigated
these side-effects somewhat. The unavoidable stigma to adults and
embarrassment to children generated by findings of cruelty, desertion,
or adultery have been eliminated. Still, a particular couple may prefer
to refrain from publicizing the circumstances of the divorce in their
community. The desire to avoid local publicity may be augmented in
jurisdictions which require conciliation proceedings. Although such
counseling is strictly private,
Any information the parties impart to the investigator would not be
confidential. It could not be confidential because this is the information
which must provide the judge with the "true facts" about the marital
rift. These are the facts which must be included in a report to the judge
and which become the basis, the major basis, of the court's decision to
grant or withhold a divorce.
Naturally the parties would be warned by their attomeys-and perhaps
should be advised by the court-that, no matter how informal the setting
of the interview with the investigator, any statement made to him may
be communicated to the judge who determines the fate of their mar-
riage."
Clearly, individuals who value privacy will favor a Caribbean divorce,
54. WHEELER, supra note 2, at 166.
55. Bronstein, supra note 52, at 4, col. 2.
56. Id.
57. KAHN & KAHN, supra note 16, at 153.
58. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L. 179,
191 (1968).
59. Id. at 199-200 [footnotes omitted].
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as the entire matter can be processed far from the eyes and ears of




The decision to grant or deny recognition to a divorce obtained in a
foreign country hinges on a court's application of "comity" principles."
As defined by the United States Supreme Court:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But
it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due re-
gard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.6,
In essence, before a state will accord comity to a foreign divorce it must
determine whether doing so would contravene its own public policy."
Since few courts have definitively answered this question for Caribbean
divorces, it is essential to examine the policies the fifty-three American
jurisdictions have established toward Mexican divorce, and to ascertain
whether the switch from Mexico to the Caribbean has necessitated
changes in those positions.
Fifty-one United States jurisdictions refuse to grant comity to Mexi-
can bilateral divorces. 3 The public policy of these dominions demands
60. Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 506, 144 A.2d 521, 525 (1958);
Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 119, 190 A.2d 684, 687 (App. Div. 1963),
affl'd, 42 N.J. 287, 195 A.2d 16 (1964); Mexican Divorces: Are They Recognized in
California?, 4 CAL. W. L. REv. 341, 345 (1968).
61. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
62. Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 265, 293 A.2d 706, 709 (Ch. Div.
1972); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 902, 903, 54 A.L.R.2d
1232, 1235 (1955); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524, 529, 192 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1934).
63. Annot., supra note 7, at 1439, and Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 206, cite New
York to be the only jurisdiction conferring recognition to foreign divorces. However, in
1969, the Virgin Islands in Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969), adopted the New
York approach:
Although we recognize that there is a divergence of view on this question among
American jurisdictions, we hold, as did the Court of Appeals of New York in that
case, that "A balanced public policy now requires that recognition of the bilateral
Mexican divorce be given rather than withheld and such recognition as a matter
of comity offends no public policy" of this Territory.
408 F.2d at 111 [footnote omitted].
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that at least one of the parties be domiciled in the forum before the court
can decree a dissolution." The brief residency characteristic of Mexican
divorces (sometimes as short as a few hours) creates no semblance of the
necessary domicile. In the words of one court:
[M]exican divorces have been refused recognition . . They are
viewed with scant regard for pretended jurisdiction because of public
knowledge that they are customarily granted without bona fide residence
or domicile. 5
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has elucidated the un-
derlying concerns of states which deny comity to foreign decrees:
To recognize the Mexican divorce as valid in the circumstances here
disclosed would frustrate and make vain all State laws regulating and
limiting divorce. By such recognition State control over the marriage
relation would be destroyed.6
Since the laws of Haiti and the Dominican Republic do not require
domicile as a prerequisite for Americans seeking divorce,17 Caribbean
decrees will probably be as repugnant to the public policy of these states
64. See, e.g., Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524, 529, 192 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1934):
It is stated in Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Conflict of Laws, § 111, that "A state
cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when neither
spouse is domiciled within the state." In Dicey's Conflict of Laws (5th ed.) 428,
occurs this statement: "the Courts of a foreign country have no jurisdiction to
dissolve the marriage of parties not domiciled in such foreign country at the
commencement of the proceedings for divorce." A considerable body of authority
supports this view.
In Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 431, 37 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1934), the court re-
marked:
The general rule is that jurisdiction over the subject-matter of divorce rests upon
domicile, or at least residence of one of the parties, and a decree of divorce
rendered in a foreign jurisdiction may be impeached and denied recognition upon
the ground that neither of the parties had such domicile or residence at the
divorce forum notwithstanding the recitals in the decree.
65. Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 506, 144 A.2d 521, 525 (1958).
66. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524, 529, 192 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1934).
67. Forscher, supra note 8, at 4, col. 3. Article II of the new Haitian divorce code
declares:
When a forein plaintiff personally submits voluntarily to the Haitian jurisdiction
and when a defendant shall have appointed a duly mandated representative, this
volontary [sic] submission of both parties to the Haitian Justice will give compe-
tence (jurisdiction) of the matter to the Haitian Court. In such cases, both parties
will be dispensed of the formalities prescribed by the Decree of November 20th,
1970, on election of domicile. . ..
Law of June 28, 1971. No residency requirement exists for Dominican jurisdiction either.
See note 8 supra.
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as were their Mexican forerunners. New Jersey is one of the few states
which has dealt directly with the issue of Caribbean dissolutions:
While I have been unable to find a reported case in New Jersey, or
elsewhere for that matter, dealing with a Haitian divorce, I am satisfied
that the kind of bilateral divorce contemplated by defendants will be
accorded no greater validity in this State than was the Mexican divorce
in Warrender . . . .The interest of the State is too great to warrant
recognition of Haitian "quickie" divorces."
Two American jurisdictions adhere to the contrary position. Some-
times called the "New York view," 9 the policy of recognizing Mexican
divorces as valid has also been adopted by the Virgin Islands." Unlike
its sister states, New York does not require that foreign divorce-seekers
be domiciliaries of the forum. In the landmark case of Rosensteil v.
Rosensteil,7' the New York Court of Appeals noted that "thousands of
persons" had relied on the courts of Mexico to dissolve their marriages,"
and declared that these one-day divorces were no more offensive to
public policy than Nevada decrees available after six weeks' residency.73
Caribbean divorces will undoubtedly be recognized as valid by the
courts of these two minority jurisdictions. Although fewer citizens have
relied upon the Caribbean fora than on the Mexican courts, the reason-
ing of the majority in Rosensteil is equally applicable: a one-day formal-
ity in Haiti or the Dominican Republic is no more artificial than the six-
week Nevada decrees which are valid in every state of the union.
Because New York has liberalized its own divorce grounds since
Roensteil,74 foreign decrees may be worthy of even firmer recognition.
Although the concurring and dissenting justices in that case were not
willing to take the radical approach pronounced by the court majority,
both minority opinions cited and supported the earlier precedent of
Gould v. Gould,71 a case in which the New York Court of Appeals
granted recognition to a French divorce in which neither party had a
French domicile. 76 The Goulds, while not intending to relinquish their
68. Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 266, 293 A.2d 706, 709 (Ch. Div.
1972).
69. See Annot., supra note 7, at 1435; Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 206.
70. See note 63 supra.
71. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1966).
72. Id. at 71, 209 N.E.2d at 711.
73. Id. at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 712.
74. At the time of the Rosensteil opinion, adultery was the only basis for divorce in New
York. Id. at 77, 209 N.E.2d at 714. The Domestic Relations Law now recognizes five
additional grounds. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1975).
75. 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
76. Id.
[Vol. 10:116
Caribbean Divorce for Americans
New York domicile, had spent many years abroad.7 7 However, the cru-
cial reason behind the court's sympathy for the Goulds was more likely
the fact that they had obtained their French divorce on a ground recog-
nized by the law of New York (adultery) .7 It is certainly logical that as
New York divorce grounds become more liberal and similar to foreign
law, judges who sympathize with the Rosensteil minority will be more
inclined to find that foreign decrees accord with public policy. One New
York court has already held that the "mutual consent" nature of some
of the state's new liberal grounds makes Dominican decrees all the more
acceptable.7 9 Likewise, should the New York legislature adopt irretrieva-
ble breakdown as a ground for dissolution (as some legal scholars pre-
dict),"0 then Haitian divorces will be'regarded as valid even under the
more conservative Gould rationale.
To date, New York's highest court has issued no decision on the valid-
ity of Caribbean decrees. However, the holdings of two lower courts
suggest that these divorces will be recognized in the same fashion as
their Mexican predecessors. The Supreme Court in Kraham v.
Kraham"' ruled that Rosensteil demands that comity be extended to
Haitian dissolutions. 2 The Supreme Court in Feinberg v. Feinberg3
found that Rosensteil now compels recognition of Dominican proceed-
ings.
84
One potential objection to the New York approach merits attention
at this point. Some recent commentators have expressed fear that Car-
ibbean decrees may face rejection by the New York Court of Appeals as
violations of § 5-311 of the New York General Obligations Law," which
declares:
A husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage
.... An agreement .... between a husband and wife, shall not be
considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains
77. Id.
78. See Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40
COLUM. L. REv. 373, 376 (1940); 23 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1923).
79. Feinberg v. Feinberg, 171 N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1974, at 20, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
To the extent our conversion divorce under sections 170(5) and 170(6) of the
Domestic Relations Law contains consensual elements, the more thoroughly con-
sensual foreign nation decree is not offensive.
80. Foster & Freed, Family Law, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 401, 402 (1974).
81. 73 Misc. 2d 977, 342 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
82. Id.
83. 171 N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1974, at 20.
84. Id.
85. See Isle of Hispaniola, supra note 2, at 208; Forscher, supra note 11, at 4, col. 4.
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an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage or provides
for the procurement of grounds for divorce."
Analysis of the pertinent case law indicates that the General Obligations
Law is not infringed by procuring Caribbean divorce decrees. Constru-
ing the similarly-worded predecessor to § 5-311,11 New York courts have
held that the statute was violated only when public policy was offended.
As the Court of Appeals explained in In re Rhinelander:u
It is no part of the public policy of this State to refuse recognition to
divorce decrees of foreign states when rendered on the appearance of
both parties, even when the parties go from this State to the foreign state
for the purpose of obtaining the decree and do obtain it on grounds not
recognized here . . . . We do have a statute nearly fifty years old, and
expressing a prohibition much older, which lays down the rule that "a
husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage."
(Domestic Relations Law, § 51.) This Court has never hesitated to en-
force that statute and to strike down any agreement fairly within its
intendment. . . . But going back as far as 1835. . . we find no expres-
sion of public policy justifying the annulment of the agreement we are
scrutinizing here."9
Relying on Rhinelander, the lower court in Rosensteil held that obtain-
ing a foreign divorce was not offensive to § 5-311.11 In fact, as one court
has concluded:
No case has been found which invalidated a Mexican divorce because the
appearance upon which it was based was signed in violation of that
section [emphasis added]."
Because Caribbean divorces do not violate public policy in New York,
they should not be invalidated under § 5-311.
B. PRACTICAL RECOGNITION
Although only two American jurisdictions formally acknowledge for-
eign divorces, citizens of other states will continue to dissolve their
marriages in the Caribbean. The courts of most jurisdictions will accord
practical recognition to these decrees under equitable doctrines of estop-
86. N.Y. GEN. OBL. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1975) [hereinafter referred to as §
5-311].
87. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 51 (McKinney 1957).
88. 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
89. Id. at 36-37, 47 N.E.2d at 684.
90. Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 638, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206, 209 (1964),
aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E. 2d 709 (1966).
91. Harges v. Harges, 46 Misc. 2d 994, 1001, 261 N.Y.S.2d 713, 721 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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pel, unclean hands, or laches.92 Recognition is effected in these situa-
tions not through declarations of validity, but rather b preventing oppo-
nents of divorces from asserting their invalidity."
The problem for those who seek divorce abroad is that such equitable
relief is not predictable. Whether equity will grant recognition depends
on the nuances of the individual case and the discretion of the particular
court. Dealing first with estoppel and unclean hands,"
[i]t is now settled that in deciding whether estoppel or unclean hands
will apply in a particular set of facts the court will appraise the "total
situation" and will weigh the equities of the parties and others affected,
as well as the interests of the State, with flexibility. 5
As another court has said, "no particular set of facts is necessary to
invoke an equitable estoppel ... ."I' Often the party who initiates the
foreign divorce will be estopped from denying its validity. In other
jurisdictions the party who procures the decree will be allowed to chal-
lenge it later on the grounds that the foreign dissolution is void ab
initio.19 Still other courts hold that an individual who aids the plaintiff
in obtaining the divorce will be prevented from attacking it.99 A number
92. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1452 (1967).
93. Id.
94. Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J.Super. 114, 120, 190 A.2d 684, 687 (App. Div. 1963)
explains:
Although estoppel in pais (equitable estoppel) and unclean hands are distinct
concepts, the terms estoppel and unclean hands have often been used -inter-
changeably.
95. Id. at 121, 190 A.2d at 688. The court opinion elucidates further:
Among the facts and circumstances which are or may be material factors in such
a controversy are whether the divorce decree is void or voidable; whether it was
obtained by the present complainant, or was participated in by him; whether it
was obtained with or without collusion or fraud upon the court, or fraud or duress
upon the adverse party; whether the other spouse has since died, or married again;
whether there are children by such second marriage; whether the complainant has
accepted the benefits of the divorce, such as alimony, or by marrying again;
whether or not the other spouse participated in the divorce, or acquiesced;
whether complainant has been guilty of laches or undue delay; what the nature
of the new suit is, and the motive or object of complainant in bringing it; whether
the complainant is an original party to the divorce action, or a child, or heir or
representative, and the like. Id. at 121-22, 190 A.2d at 687-88.
96. Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 811, 316 P.2d 710, 711 (4th Dist. 1957).
97. See Diehl v. United States, 438 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Smith, 36 F.
Supp. 412 (D.D.C. 1940).
98. See, e.g., Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937), which ruled Mexican
decrees to be totally void, subject to collateral attack in any jurisdiction.
99. See, e.g., Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (2d Dist. 1945). A
wife's suitor who aided her in procuring a foreign divorce, and paid her attorney's fees and
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of courts prohibit one who remarries in knowledge of and reliance on the
foreign decree from later challenging it."'° Some courts have applied the
same principle where the party does not remarry but establishes a mere-
tricious relationship after the foreign judgment.'0' On occasion courts
compare the relative misconduct of the couple, and refrain from estop-
ping parties in equal fault,' 2 or the party in lesser fault,' 3 from attack-
ing the decree.
Whether a state will validate a foreign divorce through laches is simi-
larly a complex question. The court's equitable disposition after the
passage of time is influenced by the conduct and circumstances of the
parties since the procurement of the decree; no precise time can be
determined as to when a divorced party is protected by laches. In the
Florida case of Pawley v. Pawley,10 4 a three-year period of silence acti-
vated the doctrine of laches and prevented a wife from contesting her
husband's Cuban divorce.' 5 By contrast, in the Wisconsin case of Estate
of Gibson,'0 ' laches did not prevent a wife from successfully challenging
her husband's Mexican decree after sixteen years of inaction.',"
Caribbean divorce-seekers domiciled in the majority rule jurisdictions
can glean one message from the relevant precedents: proceed at your
own risk. The courts will not formally recognize the foreign dissolution,
and yet the facts of the particular case may lend themselves to practical
recognition through application of equitable principles. When equitable
doctrines are not adaptable, individuals can still seek out the Caribbean
forum in the hope that their decrees will never be challenged.
CONCLUSION
The variables analyzed in this study indicate that divorce in the Car-
expenses, could not attack the Mexican decree in an action to annul his subsequent
marriage to her.
100. See, e.g., Clagett v. King, 308 A.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Schotte v. Schotte, 203
Cal. App. 2d 28, 21 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1962).
101. See, e.g., Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (4th Dist. 1957),
where a man whose wife had divorced him in Mexico was estopped from invalidating the
decree after he established a meretricious relationship with his housekeeper.
102. See, e.g., Cross v. Cross, 94 Ariz. 28,30, 381 P.2d 573, 574 (1963), where no estoppel
was declared since "both parties were in pari delicto in procuring the Mexican divorce."
103. The estoppel claim was denied the husband in Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J.
Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), afl'd, 42 N.J. 287, 195 A.2d 16 (1964), where
the wife obtained a Mexican divorce, but where he had arranged and financed the entire
affair.
104. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
105. Id.
106. 7 Wis. 2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1958).
107. Id.
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ibbean has some advantages and disadvantages for United States citi-
zens. Haitian grounds are equivalent to those established in thirty-two
American jurisdictions; Dominican grounds are somewhat more liberal.
For residents of the twenty-one more conservative jurisdictions, Carib-
bean dissolutions are clearly appealing as regards grounds for divorce.
Furthermore, the evidentiary showing demanded of the parties is
slightly less in Haiti and substantially less in the Dominican Republic
than in the United States. Yet, many American divorce hearings tend
to be pro-forma, and failure to give strict adherence to the evidentiary
requirements reduces this Caribbean advantage. Haitian and Domini-
can divorces are also more expensive to obtain than most American
dissolutions. They nonetheless offer the advantages of more rapid pro-
cessing and avoidance by the parties of unwanted publicity.
New York and the Virgin Islands will probably accord validity to
Caribbean decrees just as they respect those of sister states. Citizens of
the remaining jurisdictions must proceed at their own risk. While Carib-
bean divorces will not be formally recognized in these latter dominions,
equitable principles may serve to protect the foreign decree, or, alterna-
tively, the proceeding may never be challenged.
In the aggregate, whether Caribbean-style dissolution is preferable to
divorce at home depends on the unique situation of the parties and the
particular circumstances of their case. The enactment of no-fault legis-
lation in the United States has clearly met the needs of thousands who,
a decade ago, would have had to terminate their marriages abroad. Yet,
the institution of the Caribbean divorce has not lost all of its serviceabil-
ity, and it is likely to be utilized by American citizens for years to come.
James A. Fulton
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